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Nevada Department of Transportation v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct.,  
131 Nev. Adv. Op. 41 (June 25, 2015)1 
 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: TAKINGS CLAUSE 
 
Summary 
 
The Court determined, pursuant to the U.S. Constitution, as well as the Nevada 
Constitution, there was no taking of Ad America’s property because the Nevada Department of 
Transportation publicly disclosed its plan to comply with federal law, the City independently 
acquired property that was part of Project Neon, and the City rendered land use application 
decisions conditioned on coordination with the Nevada Department of Transportation for 
purposes of Project Neon. 
 
Background 
 
Project Neon 
The Nevada Department of Transportation (NDOT) is the lead agency for Project Neon, a 
multi phase highway and interstate improvement project through the Las Vegas metropolitan 
area. The project was originally developed in 2003, and has been amended on multiple 
occasions. In 2011, NDOT estimated Ad America’s property would be affected in 2028. NDOT 
publicly filed all amendments to Project Neon. 
 
Ad America 
 Ad America acquired a piece of property between 2004 and 2005, which would 
eventually be affected by the Project Neon development. In 2007, Ad America planned to 
renovate the property and use it as high-end commercial and office space with multi-level 
parking. However, the City Council warned against this development because of Project Neon.   
 In 2007, Ad America began informing its tenants they would eventually be affected by 
Project Neon. While rental incomes remained steady until 2010, they began to drop sharply in 
2011. As of August 2012, Ad America could no longer pay its mortgage on the property. 
 
Procedural History 
 Ad America filed and inverse condemnation action against NDOT and The City of Las 
Vegas,2 claiming economic harms stemming from the unjust taking of its property.  NDOT filed 
a motion requesting the valuation date of the property be set as May 3, 2011.  Ad America filed 
an opposition, requesting the court use the date October 24, 2007, the date of the alleged 
acquisition.  NDOT and Ad America both filed motions for summary judgment on the takings 
issue.   
 Ultimately, the district court granted Ad America’s summary judgment motion, 
determining NDOT had committed to taking the property on October 24, 2007. At the time, it 
was undisputed that any physical taking or occupation of Ad America’s property had occurred.  
In its appeal, NDOT is requesting a writ of mandamus to grant summary judgment in its favor. 
 
                                                        
1
  By Jessica Gandy. 
2
  The City was listed as a party in the suit, but never served. 
Discussion 
 
Writ Considerations 
 A writ of mandamus is available “to control an arbitrary or capricious exercise of 
discretion.” 3  Typically, an appeal is an adequate remedy and the Court often declines to 
challenge interlocutory district court orders.4  However, writ petitions are considered when “an 
important issue of law needs clarification and considerations of sound judicial economy and 
administration militate in favor of granting the petition.”5 
 The NDOT writ petition has merit and was heard for three reasons.  First, the petition 
raises important issue regarding Nevada’s takings law.  Second, the petition presents important 
policy question as to whether an agency could enter into a long-term project dependent on 
federal funding.  Third, the petition has merit on the basis of judicial economy.  Addressing the 
issues raised by Project Neon will preempt similar questions raised by similar long-term, multi-
phase projects in the future. 
 In its petition, NDOT argues there was no physical taking of Ad America’s property, nor 
were there any regulatory restrictions placed on the property, therefore no taking took place as 
the property was not needed until 2028 if federal funding was available at that time.  Ad America 
responded there was a de facto moratorium of development of Project Neon properties rendering 
it useless. 
     
Takings 
 Both the U.S. Constitution and the Nevada Constitution protect private citizens against 
government takings of property.6  Although these constitutions provide significant rights, they 
must be balanced against the needs of the state and local governments to serve the public.7 
 
Federal Takings Jurisprudence 
 As there are an infinite number of ways a state or federal government may encroach on 
one’s personal property, there is no “magic formula” to determine whether a taking has 
occurred.8  There are some circumstances which are always considered a taking:  “A direct 
appropriation or physical invasion or private property,” a government regulation authorizing 
physical invasion or property or “completely depriv[ing] an owner of all economically beneficial 
use of her property,” or an unlawful exaction in exchange for a land use permit.9  None of these 
circumstances applied to Ad America because there was no physical taking or invasion, no 
regulations were passed affecting the property, no land use permit was filed, and Ad America 
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  Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537-38 (2005), Koontz, 570 U.S.,  
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continued to collect revenue from the property; while this revenue was reduced, Ad America was 
not deprived of all economic benefit.  
 
Regulatory Analysis (Penn Central Analysis) 
 In general, a court will only consider regulatory takings claims that are ripe and have 
exhausted all available remedies.10  Ad America’s claim was unripe because it had not filed any 
land-use applications with the City.  Statements from Ad America’s analyst, based on alleged 
statements from a City Council member, imply there was a de facto moratorium on development; 
however, NDOT was able to show 19 approved land-use applications in the Project Neon area 
during the same time frame. 
 Even if the court ignored the administrative requirements, Ad America would have to 
show three factors:  (1) "the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant," (2) "the extent 
to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations," and (3) "the 
character of the governmental action."11 Here, Ad America could not prove these factors.  The 
road widening amendment in question did not have an economic impact on Ad America or its 
investment-backed expectations, and widening roads is a common government action in heavily 
populated areas, akin to “promot[ing] the common good.” 
 Even if the Court assumed all of these factors favored Ad America, which they did not, 
the Court could not find NDOT liable for the City’s actions.  There was no evidence to show 
NDOT had any influence on the city regulations, or the City decision to amend the Project Neon 
Master Plan. 
 
Nonregulatory Analysis 
 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has ruled that even if there is no 
government regulation at issue, a taking has occurred if the government has “taken steps that 
directly and substantially interfere [ ] with [an] owner's property rights to the extent of rendering 
the property unusable or valueless to the owner;” however, this analysis should only be used in 
extreme cases. 12   The Ninth Circuit uses Richmond Elks Hall v. Richmond Redevelopment 
Agency13 as an example of an extreme case of nonregulatory taking. 
 Here, the facts as presented did not meet the extremity of the Richmond Elks facts.  
Unlike Richmond Elks, Ad America’s property was not scheduled for use until 2028, if at all; at 
the time of the alleged taking, not a single property had been acquired for Project Neon.  Also 
unlike Richmond Elks, NDOT had not entered into any contracts with property owners for future 
takings.  NDOT had only filed environmental assessments (in 2009) and an environmental 
impact statement (in 2010) estimating the need for Ad America’s property in phase 5. 
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 Further contrasting Richmond Elks, Ad America’s loss of revenue was impacted by 
NDOT’s required public disclosures, in compliance with federal law.  Requiring NDOT to 
compensate Ad America in these circumstances would undermine long-term project planning.14 
 Finally, the empirical evidence did not show a loss similar to that in Richmond Elks.  
While Ad America did suffer financial loss, the property was not without value.  Ad America 
failed to provide evidence showing the rental value of similar properties to prove its economic 
damages. 
 
Nevada Takings Jurisprudence 
 Ad America claimed NDOT’s actions constituted a taking under the Nevada Constitution 
and supporting case law, relying on City of Sparks v. Armstrong15 to support its assertion.  The 
Court clarified that Armstrong had been corrected by Buzz Stew, LLC v. City of N. Las Vegas.16 
Therefore, this standard was not applied. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Based on the analysis of the facts and the law, the Court found there were no facts 
demonstrating NDOT committed to a taking of Ad America’s property that warranted 
compensation.  Therefore, they court issued a writ of mandamus overturning the summary 
judgment in favor of Ad America and granting summary judgment in favor of NDOT on the 
issue of inverse condemnation.   
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  Cf. NEV. CONST. art. 1, § 22, cl. 6 ("Property taken in eminent domain shall automatically revert back to the 
original property owner upon repayment of the original purchase price, if the property is not used within five years 
for the original purpose stated by the government.").  
15
  103 Nev. 619, 748 P.2d 7 (1987) (providing for just compensation when precondemnation activities are 
unreasonable or oppressive and diminish the market value of property).  
16
  124 Nev. 224, 181 P.3d 670 (2008). 
 
